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1.
Immanuel Kant was emphatically in favor of the death penalty for the crime 
of murder, as anyone who knows anything about Kant is likely to know. In sup-
port of his view, he made the following statement, sometimes quoted as an exam-
ple of extremism in support of capital punishment: 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its mem-
bers (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse 
throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in the prison would 
first have to be executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds de-
serve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted 
upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collab-
orators in this public violation of justice.1
This position on Kant’s part would hardly seem surprising, for Kant’s views 
on punishment are usually understood as a paradigm of retributivism, and re-
tributivism has for a long time been thought to be an especially promising source 
of a rationale in favor of capital punishment.
In Kant’s day, capital punishment was used for a variety of crimes through-
out Europe and the new world, though Kant expressly argues in favor of it only 
for the crime of murder. There is also an approving mention of capital punish-
ment for treason, where the crime is described as “attempting to destroy his fa-
therland – parricida,” but Kant does not indicate that for any other crime the 
appropriate punishment would be death.2 At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century there has been a certain evolution of views concerning capital punish-
ment. It is now widely rejected, especially by the industrial democracies of the 
world, and its retention and use is now most often found among authoritar-
ian states, countries such as China, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Sudan. A notable ex-
ception to this general pattern is the United States, which is a powerful indus-
trial democracy, and which retains and continues to use the death penalty; in 
the United States in 1999, for example, just under one hundred people were ex-
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ecuted. It would be interesting to consider why the United States is exceptional 
in this way, but we will not consider that issue here. In any event, world-wide 
today, among the countries politically organized most like Kantian republics, 
there is a near-consensus that the death penalty is best abolished. The countries 
of western Europe, recently joined by the countries of eastern Europe, South 
American countries and North American countries such as Canada and Mex-
ico are now all abolitionist. Another exception to this general pattern is Japan, 
which retains the death penalty, but does not use it often. Further, the United 
Nations has tried to move against the death penalty, and the Council of Europe 
has begun to put pressure on other countries it has relations with to cease use of 
capital punishment, most notably perhaps Turkey.3
We will consider alternative ways that Kant’s philosophical views on eth-
ics generally and on punishment more particularly could be brought into har-
mony with the present near consensus of opposition to the death penalty. We 
will make use of the notion of the contemporary consensus about certain is-
sues, particularly equality of the sexes and the death penalty, found in wide-
spread agreement, though not unanimity. Of course, it is always possible that 
some consensuses are wrong, or misguided, or mistaken. We should not put 
too much philosophical weight on the notion of a consensus here. If there is a 
consensus for the equality of women as citizens, and against the death penalty, 
this will simply suggest to us that we will want to reconsider Kant’s views on 
such topics. In both instances mentioned, his views lie outside the current con-
sensus. We will consider how to revise Kant’s views to bring them into accord 
with these current consensuses, within a theory that is still, in as significant a 
sense as possible, Kantian. Since the use of the idea of a consensus is a sort of 
short-cut, there will not be much direct discussion of arguments for or against 
the equality of women as citizens, or for or against the advisability of using the 
death penalty. Yet the discussions of these issues will illuminate certain facts 
about the structure of Kant’s moral and political theories, and about how the 
basic principles within those theories relate to particular moral applications or 
topics. If we can still end up with a thoroughly Kantian view on the death pen-
alty, that also will tell us something about the relation of Kantian ethical and le-
gal principles to the death penalty as that issue is discussed today. Opposition 
to the death penalty in present day circumstances is not at variance with the ba-
sic principles of Kantian ethical, political, and legal theory, including his retrib-
utivism in the justification of punishment. Indeed, there is a way of revising 
Kant’s views to bring them into harmony with abolition.
2.
Let us begin our discussion of Kant’s views today on the death penalty by 
considering another instance where there has been an even more decisive shift 
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of consensus away from views that Kant presented in the Rechtslehre: the equal-
ity and citizenship of women. There Kant discusses the rights and attributes of 
a citizen, and in that connection makes a distinction between active and pas-
sive citizens. Though Kant does not much develop this distinction, he appears 
to think that passive citizens possess fully such rights as rights not to be injured 
or killed, and to enter into ownership of property, but passive citizens are in 
particular lacking the right to vote, and otherwise to participate in the activities 
of government, for instance by serving as government officials or judges.4 He 
gives the following as examples of passive citizens: an apprentice, a domestic 
servant, a minor, all women, and generally “anyone whose preservation in exis-
tence (his being fed and protected) depends not on his management of his own 
business but on arrangements made by another (except the state).”5 Such indi-
viduals are lacking the “civil independence” which is a necessary attribute of 
any active citizen.6 He adds as a requirement that anyone in a position of pas-
sive citizenship “can work his way up from this passive condition to an active 
one.” 7
 Such a requirement makes sense in the cases of apprentices, servants, and 
minors, but it hardly makes sense in the case of women. It is almost as if Kant 
forgot his example of women as passive citizens when only a few lines later he 
offered this requirement for the classification of passive citizens. This proviso 
often makes sense, for in the case of apprentices and servants, it means that pas-
sive citizenship is a temporary status which they can leave behind by their own 
efforts, and it means that such individuals do not have the status of serfs or 
slaves, or any other such unchangeable status by birth, all of which Kant would 
reject, and thus the proviso is a response to a possible criticism of Kant’s pro-
posed status of passive citizens. However, women are women by birth, and 
it makes no sense to speak of working their way up from the status of being 
women. In the case of minors, their status as passive citizens is also only tempo-
rary, and if they do not work themselves up from it, they do in due course, and 
given their meeting various other requirements, achieve the status of full, ac-
tive citizens. However, there is another group that Kant does not mention, that 
causes almost as much of a problem for this proviso as women. Also among the 
group of passive citizens would be various sorts of incompetent adults: the se-
verely retarded, the severely mentally ill, the comatose, and the senile. Such in-
dividuals may have such a status from birth, or at least without personal fault 
or responsibility, and may also be unable to work their way up from such a sta-
tus. However, if we add the qualification that Kant, when he mentions the pro-
viso, has in mind otherwise competent adults, then the only problematic group 
that remains is women, who are in general otherwise competent adults, and 
who yet would lack the ability to work their way up from their status as pas-
sive citizens.
Today there is a new and for all practical purposes universal consensus on the 
status of women: they are to be accorded full status as active citizens. The same is 
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true of adult servants and apprentices: even if they lack some of the attributes of 
full citizen independency, all are to be accorded the right to vote. It can be men-
tioned in passing that one thing helpful in providing greater independency for 
voters is the institution of the secret ballot. Without such a protection a live-in 
servant, an apprentice, or a dependent spouse might be in an intolerable situa-
tion in the wake of having voted in the wrong way, and, anticipating such a de-
velopment, such individuals would effectively lack the independency that is ar-
guably a necessary attribute of a full citizen when voting. All of us, as finite and 
faulty human beings, are lacking independency to one degree or another, and 
some women are less dependent than some men.
Yet the distinction between active and passive citizen is not in itself objection-
able, because we would wish to make such a distinction today, and to put certain 
groups of individuals into the group of passive citizens. Two such groups would 
include minors and adult incompetents. The development by children of adult in-
dependence is a slow, gradual process, and some individuals proceed along this 
course more quickly than others. There is some arbitrariness and a considerable 
amount of administrative convenience in recognizing some given age as the min-
imum age for such matters as driving a car, voting, making contracts, or drink-
ing alcoholic beverages. But very young children, say those five or ten years old, 
are inevitably immature and dependent. The same is true of adult incompetents: 
there will always be difficult line drawing problems in determining the compe-
tency of adults, but there is a consensus, surely, that there are some individuals 
who would rightly be classified as legally incompetent.
If all this is correct, then it follows that the problem with Kant’s distinction 
between active and passive citizens is not with the distinction itself being ob-
jectionable or invidious in some way, but with its application to the class of 
women. In this instance, then, it is relatively easy and uncontroversial to know 
how to revise Kant’s views for acceptability today. We can retain and accept the 
distinction between active and passive citizens, but reject Kant’s view that all 
women are to fall into the class of passive citizens. In doing so, we may revise 
the scope of classification of passive citizen. In fact, given the background of his 
republicanism, and his ringing assertion of the freedom, equality, and indepen-
dence of all citizens, Kant’s basic ethical and political position is one of the clas-
sic versions of liberal equality of the sexes, as in other respects.8 His basic phil-
osophical stance is different from that of someone like Aristotle, who argues for 
natural inequality among people, and for the basic metaphysical incorrectness 
of equality and democracy.9
In this case, it seems clear that Kant’s conclusion that all women are to be re-
garded as passive citizens, though it must be rejected, does not at all lead us to 
conclude that the revisions in Kant’s views that are needed because of this re-
jection implicate any of the elements of his basic ethical or political theory. The 
issue of women as passive citizens is one for which the determination of where 
and how Kant went wrong is relatively clear and uncontroversial, and the res-
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olution does not implicate Kant’s basic ethical and political views as being in 
need of revision.
3.
In accord with today’s near consensus on the death penalty, let us assume that 
Kant’s conclusions about the appropriateness of the death penalty for murder are 
incorrect, and there needs to be some revision of those views. Here the consen-
sus against the death penalty is surely not as complete as the consensus for the 
full equality of women as citizens, though that difference will not concern us. But 
there will be another difficulty that will be greater in relation to the death pen-
alty. There will be different alternative modern revisions of the Kantian theory of 
punishment that present themselves, and so arriving at a consensus about how 
to revise the Kantian theory to remove Kant’s support of the death penalty will 
be more complicated. If Kant, following out his own ethical and political princi-
ples, has arrived at a false conclusion, where lies the mistake in his argument? Is 
the argument invalid? Are there false premises, and if so what are they? If there 
are false premises, how major a revision of Kant’s ethical and political principles 
is required to escape the false conclusion?
One response to Kant’s theory of punishment, or to retributive theories of 
the justification of punishment in general, is to criticize and reject retributivism. 
Among the many criticisms of retributive theories of the justification of punish-
ment is one which is aimed against the revenge element of such punishment, 
its perceived excessive harshness, and teleological pointlessness. One of the 
best developments of this criticism, in specific relation to Kant, is in an essay by 
Thomas Auxter, “The World of Retribution.”10 Another classic and influential 
critique and rejection of retribution in relation to capital punishment with sim-
ilar themes, but without specific reference to Kant, is the minority opinion of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall in the United States Supreme Court decision Gregg 
v. Georgia.11 Auxter admits that Kant was a retributivist in his theory of pun-
ishment, but urges that this element of Kant’s theory could be rejected with-
out major implications for the rest of Kant’s theory. He further finds the objec-
tionable basis of Kant’s favoring of the death penalty to lie precisely in Kant’s 
retributivism. We will see that Kant’s retributivism is compatible with a posi-
tion opposing the death penalty, and hence that retributivism need not be im-
plicated as we seek to revise the historical Kant’s theory into a modern Kantian 
theory that opposes the death penalty. We might also argue that the process 
by which the state offers crime victims revenge against wrongdoers, assuming 
that that is a correct description of what retributivism comes to, is too personal 
a function to be appropriately served by the public, state institutions of punish-
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ment; defenders of retributivism usually try carefully to distinguish between 
retribution and revenge.12
Auxter’s revision of Kant’s theory is more radical than the one we will con-
sider. Any sort of non-deontological theory of punishment would be greatly op-
posed to the general spirit of Kantian ethics, which is generally deeply deonto-
logical. Kant seems to think that a teleological justification of punishment could 
mean that anything goes and could result in the so-called justification of radically 
inappropriate punishments.13 The main things that recommend the lex talionis to 
Kant are the definiteness of the punishment it recommends, and the transparency 
of the rationale for that punishment to the person being punished.14 The lack of 
such definiteness and transparency within alternative views would be a Kantian 
objection to any other rationale for punishment.
In the work of Herbert Morris, there is a justification of punishment which 
takes it that at least some versions of retributivism respect the humanity of the 
person being punished, whereas other rationales do not. The alternative ratio-
nales for punishment that Auxter recommends are either thoroughly teleologi-
cal, involving isolation of violent offenders, deterrence, rehabilitation, or at least 
partially so, involving restitution, and thus may raise the possibility of the person 
being punished being used for social purposes.15 Meanwhile, teleological justifi-
cations of punishment, in certain circumstances, may themselves serve to justify 
capital punishment. Famously the classic defender of utilitarianism, J.S. Mill, was 
in favor of capital punishment on just such grounds.
While there is an emerging or partial consensus against capital punishment 
today, there is no such consensus, even in prospect, in opposition to retribu-
tivism. Thus Auxter’s proposed revision of Kant has the disadvantage of cri-
tiquing Kant’s conclusions concerning capital punishment, on which critique 
there is some consensus, by critiquing retributive rationales for punishment, on 
which critique there is very little consensus. This seems to be not a promising 
approach.
4.
Let us put Kant’s views on capital punishment in historical perspective. Kant 
proposes the use of the death penalty to be limited, primarily as a punishment for 
the crime of murder. But the laws in force for much of Kant’s life, the Constitution 
Carolina Criminalis of the German states, imposed the death penalty for a much 
wider range of crimes, including sin and possession by the devil, and further 
vested enforcement of the code in aristocrats who were free to use their powers 
for their own purposes.16 From this perspective, Kant’s views represent a limit-
ing of the use of the death penalty, and therefore a sort of progress, still assuming 
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the correctness of the contemporary consensus against the death penalty. Analo-
gously, if the practice during wars among Greek city states had been to put to the 
sword all adult males in a defeated city, it would be a beneficial change merely 
to enslave all such males, even though we might also wish to insist at some more 
abstract level that slavery is wrong. In somewhat the same way, Kant’s rejection 
of torture-executions represents a protest against and progress upon the status 
quo of his day.17 Thus Kant’s views may be progressive in the context of their 
time, even if contrary to present day consensuses.
It is sometimes claimed that carrying out the death penalty has a brutalizing 
effect on people who become aware of the executions, or, as in earlier days, wit-
ness public executions. The idea that capital punishment has a deterrent effect 
presupposes that would-be murderers identify themselves with the person exe-
cuted, and say, “I do not want that to happen to me.” But it is perhaps equally 
likely that would-be murderers identify themselves with the executioner, and 
say, “I know someone who deserves a similar fate,” perhaps an ex-lover, or a ri-
val for a lover, or someone viewed as an unfair competitor. When this happens, 
executions may encourage rather than discourage potential murderers to proceed 
with their plans, and the deterrence of crime may actually be weakened. It surely 
goes against Kant’s grain to seek to maximize deterrence; maximization is more 
characteristically a utilitarian idea. We are perhaps talking about something more 
troubling here, punishments that may have the effect of inciting further crimes, 
something that arguably would have been of concern to Kant. A Kantian could 
be urged to be concerned about such harmful possible consequences, without un-
dermining Kant’s general retributivist approach to punishment.
Another related point that has to do as much to the symbolism of the death 
penalty as to actual effects of carrying it out is the concern that governments 
should not have such extreme power against their citizens, the power exempli-
fied in the relation of annihilation that exists as the executioner terminates the 
life of the person executed. It might be urged that such relations of one person 
to another are all too representative of totalitarian states such as those run by 
Fascists or Leninists, or authoritarian states, or the relation of absolute power or 
control that some individuals seek to wield over others in private life that too 
often produce crimes of violence among those intimate with one another. All 
species of such complete dominance of one individual by another are morally 
objectionable, and should be rejected and eliminated as far as possible: slav-
ery, concubinage, rape, and the relation that a controlling male seeks with a fe-
male are other such instances. But peaceful and democratic, or Kantian-repub-
lican, societies should arguably never exemplify or encourage such wrongful 
relations among people.18 Such reasons were significant in causing western Eu-
ropeans to move away from the death penalty after the violence of World War 
II and its aftermath. Europeans had had all too much experience with tyrannical 
use of the death penalty to feel equanimity about continuing its use in their so-
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cieties. Today the continuing use of the death penalty has often been carried out 
in such contexts, including Iran, Iraq, the People’s Republic of China, South Af-
rica, and Chile.
As another instance of such thinking about actual harmful effects, or sym-
bolic aspects of certain forms of punishment, it may be observed that Kant, 
though recommending the lex talionis in certain instances, also seeks out “sym-
bolically equivalent” punishments in certain cases. Rather than rape the rapist, 
he proposes the rapist be castrated; rather than give back exactly the same kind 
of treatment to the person who engages in bestiality, he proposes excluding such 
a person from human society.19 Without endorsing these proposed symbolic al-
ternative punitive retaliations, they show that Kant is willing to adjust the pun-
ishment when a literally like punishment is either impossible or morally objec-
tionable. In like fashion, if it should be shown that the death penalty ought to be 
regarded as morally unavailable for use in contemporary society, a contemporary 
Kantian should be willing to settle for the alternative of a long prison sentence, 
even though Kant himself argued forcefully that life in prison is much different 
from death, too different to be an appropriate punishment for murder.20 Analo-
gously, if a torture-execution or a punishment consisting of raping the rapist is 
morally unavailable, a Kantian will have to settle for some less precisely match-
ing symbolically equivalent punishment.
In a general statement, Kant says that all murderers should be executed. But 
then he proceeds to discuss a variety of examples that constitute empirical excep-
tions to this abstract statement, including cases of young women who kill their 
babies born out of wedlock, soldiers killing one another in a duel, and a murder 
where “the number of accomplices to such a deed is so great that the state, in or-
der to have no such criminals in it, could soon find itself without subjects.”21 He 
also gives other cases where appropriate punishment should be adjusted accord-
ing to the social status of the wrongdoer, again suggesting that the abstract lex 
talionis in actual application must have a variety of exceptions and appropriate 
adjustments.
There are a variety of concerns about the death penalty today in the United 
States that might call for various sorts of empirical adjustments in the abstract 
law of executions for murder. Concerns about the risk of executing the innocent, 
due to defective or at least inadequate legal procedures for determining guilt and 
imposing punishment, and about the discriminatory effects of race and class in 
imposing the death penalty are often mentioned. When we pay closer attention 
to the role of the executioner, we find another related problem with capital pun-
ishment. There is anecdotal testimony about the harmful effects of executions on 
those who must carry them out. Such experiences may lead to alcoholism, men-
tal breakdowns, or emotional breakdowns at the time or later. For some individ-
uals the effects may be different though equally undesirable. They may get to like 
participating in such events. We could argue that the actions of an executioner 
would violate his duty to himself, analogous to the way that Kant argues that act-
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ing cruelly towards animals would violate our duty to ourselves.22 In both cases, 
the action undertaken, when considered without reference to the moral selfhood 
of the agent, is morally indifferent, because in Kant’s view we have no direct ob-
ligations to animals in the first instance, and because the execution as carried out 
on the criminal convicted of murder is legally and morally justifiable in the sec-
ond. Yet such actions are arguably damaging to the moral selfhood of the agent, 
and are hence a violation of her duty to herself.
5.
Let us turn to the preferred revision of the Kantian theory of punishment to 
bring it into accord with the contemporary consensus against capital punish-
ment. When Kant is arguing in favor of capital punishment as the only appropri-
ate punishment for murder, he adds a qualification that we will need to attend to 
closely. Death is the punishment that must be carried out on the wrongdoer, “al-
though it must still be freed from any mistreatment that could make the human-
ity in the person suffering it into something abominable.”23 This statement seems 
intended to rule out various forms of torture-execution that were still occasion-
ally practiced within Kant’s century, practices such as drawing and quartering, 
and breaking on the wheel. Analogously, and at almost the same time, the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, part of the Bill of Rights of 1789, 
forbade cruel and unusual punishment, presumably with similar meaning and 
intent: this phrase could hardly be read as forbidding capital punishment in gen-
eral at the time, since capital punishment was practiced throughout the thirteen 
states, and its existence as a judicial practice is in many other passages in the Con-
stitution assumed as existing.
In a later passage Kant expands on the above quoted statement.
Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious person as a person; 
I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as 
a person, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it. So 
there can be disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself, such 
as quartering someone, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and 
ears. Not only are such punishments more painful than loss of possessions 
and life to those who love honor, who claim the respect of others, as every-
one must; they also make a spectator blush with shame as belonging to a 
species that can be treated that way.24
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
the death penalty and, in a badly split five to four decision, ruled capital pun-
ishment as it then existed in the United States, unconstitutional.25 It was un-
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clear whether the court at that point wished to say that capital punishment 
in any form would remain unconstitutional. Only two out of the nine jus-
tices, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshal, made clear in their concur-
ring opinions that the death penalty in any form ought to be regarded as un-
constitutional. The other justices who made up the majority of five, William 
O. Douglas, Potter Stewart, and Byron White, left open the possibility that 
in later cases a death penalty law in some different form might pass consti-
tutional muster. The two justices who remained on the court in 1976, Stew-
art and White, joined the majority in Gregg v. Georgia, with Stewart writing 
for the majority, in deciding that the death penalty was not per se unconstitu-
tional, and that the newly proposed law from Georgia in particular was con-
stitutionally acceptable.26
Brennan’s opinion in Furman is particularly interesting because its central ar-
gument is so Kantian. The central point of the constitutional prohibition on “cruel 
and unusual” punishment, he urges, is “that a punishment must not by its sever-
ity be degrading to human dignity,” and his criteria for such punishments are in-
dicated as follows:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is 
inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, 
and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more 
effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction 
of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may 
not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of 
crimes.27
Brennan’s entire discussion of these four principles has a certain Kantian flavor 
and undertone, for example, when he urges, in connection with the fourth prin-
ciple that “if the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it 
more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values. That, after 
all, is why we no longer carry out public executions,” but the most intensely Kan-
tian part of Brennan’s opinion, his discussion of the severity of the death penalty, 
is worth quoting at some length:
Death is a truly awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human 
being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed per-
son’s humanity. An individual in prison does not lose “the right to have 
rights.” A prisoner retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free 
exercise of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to 
treatment as a “person” for purposes of due process of law and the equal 
protection of the laws. The contrast with the plight of a person punished 
by imprisonment is evident. A prisoner remains a member of the human 
family. Moreover, he retains the right of access to the courts. His punish-
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ment is not irrevocable. . . . As one 19th century proponent of punishing 
criminals by death declared, “When a man is hung, there is an end of our 
relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, ‘You are not fit for 
this world, take your chance elsewhere’.”28
Brennan immediately draws the conclusion: “In comparison to all other punish-
ments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is 
uniquely degrading to human dignity.”
One of the cases that lay in the background of Furman, and was referred to 
and discussed by the justice’s opinions, was Trop v. Dulles.29 In this case the court 
ruled out as unconstitutional, because of its violation of the prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment, the punishment of expatriation, loss of citizenship. Ar-
guably, however, and Brennan does make the point in his Furman opinion, al-
though expatriation may seem a terrible and degrading punishment, death is 
even more degrading.
But there is another element of the influence of Trop: a much quoted phrase 
that comes from the opinion of Chief Justice Earl Warren writing for the plural-
ity speaks of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.”30 This phrase is used to justify departures from practices and un-
derstandings current at the time the Bill of Rights was first adopted. It implies 
that there can sometimes be an evolution of societal opinion, so that practices ac-
cepted at one time, such as corporal punishment, or laws forbidding miscegena-
tion, come to be judged unacceptable at a later time, and legal decisions must re-
flect such evolution.
It may well be that the original intent of the Eighth Amendment, in forbid-
ding cruel and unusual punishments, did not extend far beyond forbidding tor-
ture-executions. In the same vein, as we have seen, Kant rejected torture-execu-
tions while accepting capital punishment for murder. We can see Brennan using 
almost the same argument, but extending what it excludes to capital punishment 
in general.
Here we have what may seem to be a straightforward disagreement. The ar-
guments of Kant and Brennan are similar in their rationales for excluding cer-
tain forms of punishment, but Kant and Brennan disagree about the scope of 
the application of the arguments for exclusion. The Kantian considerations 
that Brennan invokes he extends beyond their Kantian base to be an argument 
against capital punishment in general. Without being able to conclude easily 
or clearly that one is wrong, the other right, we can at least mention some con-
siderations that bear on the question of who is closer to being correct. First are 
some considerations that are perhaps in the background of the thinking of both 
authors.
Brennan and Kant may have different conceptions of death. Kant famously 
argued for the immortality of the soul, and at one point he uses a sort of eu-
phemism to describe the death penalty, when he writes that “a person can 
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never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or be put 
among the objects of rights to things: His innate personality protects him from 
this, even though he can be condemned to lose his civil personality.”31 The 
German here, more clearly than this translation, expresses a difference in his 
innate personality, which can never be lost, and his civil personality, which 
can be taken from him. In contrast, as the extended quote from Brennan in-
dicates, to die is to be annihilated, to lose everything there is to lose. It is not 
clear that there are different conceptions here, since Kant would agree with 
Brennan that a person who has been executed has, civilly speaking, lost ev-
erything, and Brennan is simply not addressing any aspect of personality that 
might be extra civil. Still, there may be some differences here that make a dif-
ference. Furthermore, the correctional institution, to which individuals with 
criminal convictions may be sentenced for extended periods of time, is an in-
stitution that did not exist in Kant’s day as it does in ours. We have a much 
clearer sense that there is an alternative to the death penalty. Long prison sen-
tences, up to life without parole, are, whether morally or jurisprudentially de-
fensible or not, a real possibility, and an alternative to death. Since Kant ex-
plicitly rejects the alternative of life, we cannot say counterfactually that if 
there had been an alternative of professional corrections available in Kant’s 
day, it would have affected his views, but it might have done so, even uncon-
sciously, by affecting his sense of what the practically available alternatives 
for punishment were.32
Let us consider what might have been the basis for Kant’s view that torture-
executions cause the humanity of the person being executed to be regarded as 
abominable. The operative word in the German is Scheusal, whose literal trans-
lation is “monster.” Mary Gregor translates the word with the adjective “abom-
inable.”33 Translations of the related abstract noun, “Scheusslichkeit” are “atroc-
ity, horrible deed, hideousness.” There are many thoughts that might be carried 
by this word. When a torture-execution is carried out, the victim’s death is slow 
and painful. There may be great screams or roars of pain that erupt from the 
person. The person may lose control of his bodily functions, and involuntarily 
vomit, urinate, or defecate. In some forms of execution there is one or another 
form of bodily mutilation, as when a person’s limbs are torn away. One of the 
reasons that the guillotine is not proposed as a means of execution in the United 
States, is because of the mutilation of bodily form that it effects, and because of 
its extreme bloodiness, even though medical opinion has long considered it to 
be one of the quickest and most painless forms of death. The disembowelment 
that is a part of some torture-executions, would be terrible for the spectators to 
see, and terrible for the still conscious person being executed to see. The Person-
lichkeit of the person being executed is here being seen at its worst: completely 
lacking in dignity and self-control. The quote from the later passage above sug-
gests that Kant’s point is that the activities involved in a torture-execution are 
themselves shameful, indeed, sufficient to cause the spectator to blush. Why 
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would we blush in shame at a torture-execution? One explanation is that such 
an execution, even in a monarchy and more so in a republic, is closer to be-
ing done in our name, closer than the perhaps equally horrible deeds of a mur-
derer. Analogously, when we receive accounts of atrocities carried out in war-
time, we would be closer to blushing in shame if it was our side alleged to have 
committed them, rather than the other side. As suggested earlier, the effects on 
spectators and executioners may be either horror and long-term mental harm, 
or the beginning of an acquisition of a taste for and pleasure in such cruelty. Ei-
ther outcome is a bad outcome.
When the reaction of a spectator or participant is horror and self-damage, 
there is presumably some underlying pity for the person being executed. In 
such a case the observer maintains some sense of the humanity of the per-
son executed, and the stark contrast between the humanity and the treat-
ment being undergone is too much for the observer to bear. When the reaction 
is instead the beginnings of pleasure, then the person executed has become 
entirely an object, totally lacking in humanity or dignity, and wholly the ap-
propriate object of any form of hard treatment. Such individuals may be de-
scribed as animals, vermin, or scum. The executioner or passive observer 
would be beginning to believe that there are certain classes of individuals for 
whom such terms are appropriate, and for whom such treatment is appropri-
ate, as in the case of despised individuals such as serial killers Ted Bundy, 
Wayne Gacy, Jeffrey Dahmer, or despised groups such as Jews, Gypsies, or 
homosexuals. Alternatively, there may be the beginnings of a general objec-
tification of all people with whom an individual comes into contact, the con-
ceiving of all other persons as individuals to be manipulated for the control-
ler’s own advantage, in such ways as are said to be characteristic of people 
described as sociopaths or psychopaths, or in such ways as are said to occur 
when people, especially men, come to conceive of the objects of their sexual 
desires, especially women, as purely sexual objects.
The differences between a torture-execution and a regular execution would 
seem to be a matter of degree. Successful regular executions, to say nothing 
of the all too common botched executions, have some of the characteristics of 
torture-executions for participants and spectators, though to a lesser degree, 
and perhaps only in unintentional ways. The assumption here would be that 
in approved methods of execution that are intended to produce, so far as pos-
sible, quick death with a minimum of physical pain, any actual physical suf-
fering is purely unintentional. When we speak of the pain connected with the 
most clinical means of execution, we have so far been limiting ourselves to the 
question of physical pain during the execution process, and have been saying 
nothing about the considerable psychological pain of anticipating our own 
death by execution.
When we witness, or participate in, any form of torture-execution, it must 
be difficult to maintain our belief, as Kant has said, that the innate Personlich-
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keit of the person executed endures unscathed, with the only loss being a loss 
of his civil personality. It may be difficult for the executioner to maintain his 
own self-respect intact, given the activities he has engaged in; and it must be 
difficult for others to maintain such respect for such individuals. This helps to 
explain why there exists a common practice of keeping the identity of the exe-
cutioner secret.
Given these unpleasant facts about executions, we might feel some doubt 
about Kant’s belief that the execution of the guilty individual is compatible with 
his human dignity or that of his executioners. If the problems with torture-exe-
cutions are also problems with regular executions, and the differences are a mat-
ter of degree, it becomes more difficult to draw a line between the two, rating one 
as acceptable, the other as unacceptable. But this is hardly a conclusive argument 
against Kant’s position favoring capital punishment for murder.
Let us turn to Brennan’s discussion of the penalty of death. As he argues that 
executions are incompatible with the human dignity of the person executed, his 
main theme is the totality of the fact of death which entirely destroys the sub-
ject, leaving nothing left over. There are not even any rights to have rights. The 
theme is that an execution is an annihilation, a total elimination of an individ-
ual. This is the fact that makes executions extremely severe punishments, and 
that makes them incompatible with the dignity of the human subject. If the per-
son executed is reduced to nothingness, then how can we say that his human 
dignity survives, or that his execution is compatible with his dignity as a hu-
man being?
6.
It appears that we can maintain most of the elements of Kant’s general theory 
of punishment while being opposed to capital punishment. Or to put the point in 
a different way, Kant himself could have taken a position of general opposition to 
capital punishment and still have presented a recognizably Kantian and retribu-
tivist position on the justification of punishment.
It seems that Kant saw women as invariably and inevitably totally dependent 
upon males, and hence inevitably lacking the independence requisite for proper 
functioning as active citizens. His views were in accord with the consensus, 
though not the unanimous opinion, of his day.34 That consensus has changed, 
and women are viewed as human beings who have and ought to be regarded as 
having as much of citizen-independency as any man.
The consensus has also changed with respect to capital punishment. Here it is 
harder to specify what has changed, though capital punishment seems less nec-
essary and inevitable today. Perhaps especially western Europeans in the wake 
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of World War II have had a livelier appreciation of the abuses that are either in-
evitable or are at least the frequent accompaniments of the practice. Perhaps the 
conception of death has altered. In addition to mentioning the theological back-
ground of Kant’s idea that human personality survives death, we might note an-
other case he mentions where the man of honor would prefer death to life, and 
the scoundrel the reverse.35 Surely the idea of death as honorable in some sense 
to be sought after has, happily, faded. We have perhaps also come to have a live-
lier appreciation of what is after all a deeply Kantian point that all punishment 
must respect the humanity of the person who undergoes it, and we have, many of 
us, moved closer to Brennan’s views about where the line is to be drawn between 
punishments that are acceptable on this basis and those that are not.
The suggestion that there is a near or emerging consensus of opposition to the 
death penalty is no reason for complacency. This consensus is manifestly not to 
be found in the United States, where most states execute people. Public opinion is 
still seemingly strongly in favor of the death penalty, and political leaders regard 
it as imprudent in the extreme to oppose it. Arguments for and against the death 
penalty are still live arguments in the United States. 
Kant does not come out so badly in this discussion. In the face of the emerg-
ing consensus against the death penalty, most of his theory of punishment can be 
preserved, and he may have pointed us to the most basic, principled and impor-
tant reason for opposing the death penalty in general, even as he failed to arrive 
at this conclusion himself. The death penalty is wrong because its use is incom-
patible with the dignity of being human which is present even in the worst and 
most deserving subject of punishment.
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